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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a tax evasion game with taxpayers learning by
imitation. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive
share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the
existing literature that yields full compliance of audited taxpayers who are
rational, have a lot of information and thus do not need to interact. When
the authority adjusts auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-
auditing occurs. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is
explained within the model rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. JEL
Classification: C79, H26
Keywords: tax evasion, imitation, learning
1 Introduction
The magnitude and importance of shadow sector is hard to overestimate. Just to
mention one case, the official estimate of informal GDP for Russia is about 1/3 of
formal GDP in the recent years1. A fundamental aspect of the informal activities is
tax evasion, which is usually defined as an effort to lower one’s tax liability in the
way prohibited by law. The paper considers exclusively this phenomenon, leaving
∗I am grateful to Gregor Langus, David Perez-Castrillo, Rick van der Ploeg and Karl Schlag for
valuable comments.
1A summary of recent attempts to estimate the size of tax evasion, avoidance and other informal
activities is given in Schneider and Enste (2000). The results vary a lot with method and country
considered; one common finding is that the shadow sector is growing over time.
1
tax avoidance and criminal activities aside. Specifically, it is devoted to the income
tax evasion, which has received the most attention in the theoretical modeling of
tax evasion. Such attention can be partially attributed to the existence of relatively
reliable data on this matter (Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the
US). Another reason might be tradition founded by the seminal model of Allingham
and Sandmo in 1972.
A detailed survey of the models of income tax evasion can be found in Andreoni,
Erard and Feinstein (1998). They identify two directions in the modeling of strategic
interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities: principal-agent approach (e. g.,
Vasin and Vasina (2002)) and game theoretic approach (e. g., Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Peter Bardsley (1997), Waly Wane (2000)). Both
approaches treat the taxpayers as a single player maximizing expected payoff of cheat-
ing. All the literature in tax evasion we are aware of maintains the assumption of
no communication among the taxpayers. In reality however a taxpayer is not an
isolated decision maker, she/he lives in a society and constantly interacts with other
taxpayers.
This paper is an attempt to relax the assumption of no social interaction among
the taxpayers, hence its main feature is an explicit characterization of taxpayers’
communication. This is achieved by using the framework of learning in games. The
type of learning we use is imitation. Our taxpayers are boundedly rational, and they
decide whether to cheat or not cheat depending on payoffs from cheating obtained
in the previous period by themselves and by those whom they meet. This can be
contrasted with more rational Bayesian updating, for instance when the agents have
priors on the probability distribution of auditing intensity and learn more about this
distribution through their own play and interaction with others. Our model matches
a number of stylized facts about evasion.
First, in reality taxpayers possess poor knowledge of audit rules, usually overes-
timating the probability of audit (Andreoni et al. 1998). In the model they do not
know it, but rather imitate actions of other individuals. Other possible sources of
information, such as media, are not considered for the sake of simplicity. Second,
another feature of reality - heterogenous information taxpayers possess - is reflected
in the initial distribution of strategies between cheating and not cheating. Third,
the real world tax authority is an organization that acts in a substantially different
way than an individual taxpayer. This organization has resources and incentives to
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gather all available information, whereas every individual prefers not to incur costs of
information collection. The model reflects this asymmetry directly: the tax authority
is updating its belief about the distribution of the taxpayers, whereas each of the
taxpayers just imitates. Fourth, tax evasion is an intertemporal decision. This is
supported among others by the Engel and Hines’ study (1999). In our framework the
individuals have one-period memory that allows them to choose a strategy tomor-
row on the basis of today’s observation of the behavior of the others and their own.
As the income reporting is a rare (annual) event, short memory can be a plausible
assumption.
These four features are considered in a simple version of tax evasion relation with
two levels of income and homogenous population of low-income taxpayers. Learn-
ing rule used by the members of this population is a simple imitation of a better-
performing strategy. We consider three scenarios that vary according to the amount
of information of taxpayers and their attitude towards punishment.
The main result of the model is the cycling dynamics it generates. In all scenarios
considered, both the share of evading taxpayers and the auditing intensity of tax
authority exhibit fluctuations giving rise to stable cycles. The system is cycling
around an unstable steady state, in which the share of cheaters (people evading their
tax) is the same as in the Nash equilibrium of one-shot game, whereas the auditing
probability is not related to its Nash equilibrium value. This happens because in
the game the cheating is effectively determined by the rationality of tax authority,
whereas the intensity of auditing is actually established by the learning rule and
parameters of the game.
From the dynamics generated we can see that in presence of boundedly rational
agents the equilibrium play does not actually occur. Therefore, the dynamics is
necessary to be taken into account in order to make accurate inference about the
welfare effects of various policies. The estimation of such effects, however, requires
calibration of the parameters of the model, which is a separate issue.
Our model replicates a number of stylized facts. Firstly, non-zero cheating of
audited taxpayers is obtained for the commitment case, which is certainly more plau-
sible than absolute honesty of the most of the conventional principle-agent models
(for example, Sanchez and Sobel 1993, Andreoni et al.1998). Secondly, in the non-
commitment case the following features of dynamics are explained: decreasing compli-
ance (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde 1986) and auditing probability (Dubin, Graetz
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and Wilde 1990, Adreoni at al. 1998, p.820) observed in the US in the second half
of XX century, as well as the recent increase in auditing probability with continuing
decrease of compliance (Slemrod 2004, p.1). These patterns could not be explained
by the literature to date since only static models were used.
Additionally, an alternative explanation for the puzzle of too much compliance is
offered. It is largely discussed in the literature that people comply much more than
a simple lottery model of evasion predicts. Our results suggest that the reason might
not be in the presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers2, but in the fact that the
system is far from the equilibrium. This is best illustrated in the commitment case:
if the share of cheating taxpayers is below its equilibrium value, it stays so forever,
and it looks as if taxpayers were cheating too little.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 outlines the
simple static game which is then played repeatedly. Dynamics of such play is analyzed
in section 3, where different learning rules are considered. Underlying the baseline
average payoff rule is the norm of high tolerance of evasion and the assumption
that taxpayers share among themselves a lot of information about evasion. The
effective punishment rule is less favorable to the cheating, but keeps high informational
requirement. The popularity rule is least encouraging for evasion, it also assumes
minimum information communicated between taxpayers. Concluding section stresses
limitations of the model and outlines its possible extensions and applications. All
propositions in the paper bear a letter corresponding to a learning rule: ”A” for the
average payoff, ”E” for effective punishment, and ”M” for m agents meeting.
2 Classical game theory: a simple model
As a starting point for modeling dynamics we take a simple one-shot game of tax
evasion, based on Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986). Intrinsically honest taxpay-
ers (who can not evade for moral reasons) are eliminated from that model, as their
presence does not change the results in the given setup. The timing is as follows:
1. The nature chooses income for each individual from two levels, high H with
probability γ and low L with probability 1− γ;
2. Taxpayers report their income, choosing whether to evade or not;
2This is how the puzzle is usually resolved in the literature (for references see, e.g., Slemrod
(2000)).
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3. Tax agency decides whether to audit or not.
It is obvious, that low income people never choose to evade, because they are
audited for sure, if they report anything lower than L. At the same time, the high
income people can evade, since with a report L tax agency does not know, whether
it faces a truthful report by the lower income people, or cheating from the higher
income ones. Then the game simplifies to the one between higher income people and
tax agency:
audit not audit
cheat (1− t)H − st(H − L), tH + st(H − L)− c H − tL, tL
not cheat (1− t)H, tH − c (1− t)H, tH
where t is an income tax rate, s is a surcharge rate, determining fine for the given
amount of tax evaded, c is audit cost; all of them are assumed to be constant and
exogenously given for the tax-raising body3.
Then the tax authority maximizes its expected revenue choosing the probability
to audit p given probability of cheating q:
p(
qγ
qγ + 1− γ (tH + st(H − L)) +
1− γ
qγ + 1− γ tL− c) + (1− p)tL (1)
which is linear in probability due to linearity of audit cost function. The multipliers
for the payoffs are probabilities to come across high income cheaters (qγ) or low
income honest taxpayers (1− γ) given that only low income reports are audited.
First order condition holds with equality for the value of
q =
1− γ
γ
c
t(1 + s)(H − L)− c
This is the value of cheating probability in the unique mixed strategies Nash equilib-
rium.
A high income individual maximizes its expected payoff given probability of audit:
pq ((1− t)H − st(H − L)) + (1− p)q(H − tL) + (1− q)(1− t)H (2)
3Endogenous determination of tax and penalty rate is an interesting task, but it constitutes the
problem of a government rather than a tax authority. Moreover, it has been largely discussed in the
literature, see, for example, Cowell (1990).
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which is also linear in probability because of the nature of expected utility. The
equilibrium value of p is 1
1+s
.
Simple comparative statics shows that auditing probability is decreasing with fine;
the extent of evasion is increasing with costs of auditing and decreasing with fine, tax
rate, income differential and share of high income people. Among others, we implicitly
assumed here linear tax and penalty schemes, risk neutral individuals, and linear cost
function for the tax authority. Even with these strong assumptions, considering the
dynamics generated by the game allows to get some non-trivial insights of what could
be going on in reality.
3 Dynamics
Now consider the game presented in the previous section played every period from
0 to infinity. As before, the populations of high income and low income taxpayers
are infinite size with measures of γ and 1 − γ respectively, and this is a common
knowledge. The proportion qτ of high income population is cheating by reporting low
income at time τ , the agency is auditing the low income reports with probability pτ .
Since we consider two aggregated levels of income, it is plausible to assume that
the people know the income of those whom they interact with. In reality the precise
amount of income is not known, but whether a given person has high or low income is
easily guessed from observable by other taxpayers characteristics. But the authority
does not observe these characteristics, so the type of income is private knowledge of
the agents who meet. On the other hand, the probability of auditing p is a private
knowledge of the authority. Between the rounds the tax agency updates its belief
about the distribution of taxpayers between cheating and not cheating, the high
income agents are learning whose strategy performs better.
Irrespective of the rule, at time τ there are the following types of high income
taxpayers: (i) honest, comprising proportion 1−qτ of population and receiving payoff
(1− t)H; (ii) caught cheating, qτpτ of population with payoff (1− t)H − st(H − L);
(iii) not caught cheating, qτ(1− pτ) of population with payoff H − tL.
Note that the payoff when not cheating is bigger than when cheating and caught,
but smaller than when cheating and not caught. The tax agency is maximizing its
long-run expected revenue by choosing auditing probability for all periods (commit-
ment), or its expected revenue in the next period by choosing auditing probability
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for the next period (no commitment).
As it has already been mentioned, we can not take a ready aggregate dynamics
for the population of taxpayers because of the asymmetric nature of the players: in
the no commitment case the tax authority is using miopic best response, whereas tax-
payers imitate each other. Without such asymmetry, our game resembles emulation
dynamics as it is defined by Fudenberg and Levine (1998), which is known to converge
to replicator dynamics under some assumptions. However, these assumptions are not
satisfied in our setup: most strikingly, each individual communicates with more than
one other. Due to this feature, even payoff monotonicity of the aggregate dynamics
can not be established. Thus, we have to derive aggregate dynamics every time from
the elementary imitation rules.
In order to proceed we have to specify these learning rules.
3.1 Meeting two others: Average payoff principle
An agent A meets agents B and C, each of them has played strategies sA, sB, sC . If
sA = sB = sC, and average payoff of B and C is greater than the payoff of A, he/she
switches to their strategy. If sC = sA = sB, A switches in case the payoff of B is
greater. The average of caught and not caught payoffs is bigger than the payoff of
honest ((1− t)H − st(H −L)+H − tL > 2(1− t)H) for plausible value of fine s < 1.
As a result, an honest taxpayer (recall that we have 1 − q of them) switches to
cheating, if it faces either two non-caught cheaters (this happens with probability
((1− p) q)2) or a non-caught cheater and an honest taxpayer ((1− p) q (1− q)). It
remains honest with a complementary probability (1−((1− p) q)2−(1− p) q (1− q)).
A caught taxpayer (there are pq) switches to honest, if it observes either two honest
taxpayers ((1− q)2) or an honest and a caught taxpayer (2pq(1− q)). A not caught
taxpayer never switches.
Summing up, between rounds (1 − q + qp)2 of honest agents remain honest, and
(1− q)(1− q + 2qp) of caught taxpayers become honest. Thus,
1− qτ+1 = (1− qτ)
[
(1− qτ + qτpτ )2 + pτqτ (1− qτ + 2pτqτ)
]
(3)
This equation defines the aggregate dynamics of the population we were interested in.
As can be seen, the proportion of honest taxpayers tomorrow is completely determined
by the proportion of honest taxpayers today and the probability of auditing today4.
4Notice that it has nothing in common with discrete time approximations of replicator dynamics
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Wewant to see what features this dynamics possess, namely, we want to know whether
the proportion of honest taxpayers is shrinking or expanding as time passes. For this
purpose it proves useful to define a threshold level of cheating q¯ as
q¯ :=
2− 3p
1− 3p+ 3p2
The following proposition shows that the evolution of the cheating share crucially
depend on the level of auditing probability. We drop the time subscript τ for con-
vinience wherever all the variables belong to the same period.
Proposition 1A Consider the dynamics of the share of evaders q for the average
payoff principle defined by (3). The share of honest taxpayers in the next
period is lower than that in this period if auditing probability in this period is
p ∈ [0, 1√
3
). It is higher in the next period if p ∈ (2
3
, 1]. For p ∈ ( 1√
3
, 2
3
) it is
lower, if q < q¯ and higher, if q > q¯.
All proofs are left to the appendix. Unexpectedly, in the small middle interval,
change in the proportion of honest taxpayers is negatively related to the number
of the honest taxpayers. This ”anti-scale” effect is explained by the high enough
detection probability, for which the caught cheaters contribute more to the increase
of proportion of the honest, than the honest themselves.
Further we consider two cases for the behavior of tax authority. If it is unable to
announce its auditing probability and keep it forever, we are in the "game theoretic"
framework, and the our dynamics has two dimensions: already derived one for q and
another one for p. We start, however, with a more simple case, when the auditors
can credibly commit to a certain constant in time strategy (probability), and hence
the dynamics is collapsing to one dimension.
3.1.1 Commitment
Assume that the authority commits to a certain auditing probability p once and
forever (this corresponds to the principle-agent framework defined by Andreoni et al,
1998). Letting q0 = 0 and q0 = 1 we obtain from the proposition 1A the following
corollary:
or any other well-known dynamics, as was expected.
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Corollary In the evasion game with the average payoff dynamics defined by (3)are
lim
τ→∞
qτ = 1 when p ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
, lim
τ→∞
qτ = 0 when p ∈
[
2
3
, 1
]
, and lim
τ→∞
qτ = q¯
when p ∈
(
1√
3
, 2
3
)
.
Let us define a function qˆ (p) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that maps a set of possible auditing
probabilities into a set of long-run outcomes of q. As the corollary states, this function
has a following form:
qˆ (p) =

1, p ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
q¯, p ∈
(
1√
3
, 2
3
)
0, p ∈ [2
3
, 1
]
The authority chooses p to maximize its payoff
γ(1− qˆ(p))tH + p(qˆ(p)γ(tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ)tL)
−cp(qˆ(p)γ + 1− γ) + (1− p)(qˆ(p)γ + 1− γ)tL (4)
Let us call the probability that maximizes thsis expression the optimal auditing
probability p∗. If p∗ ∈
(
1√
3
, 2
3
)
, it satisfies the first order condition
(1 + s)(q¯ + pq¯′)− q¯′ = µ [1− γ + γ(q¯ + pq¯′)] (5)
where µ := c
t(H−L) .
Note that p∗ /∈
(
0, 1√
3
)
and p∗ /∈ (2
3
, 1
)
because for constant q the objective
function is linear in p. Furthermore, p = 1 is never optimal because the objective
function is non-increasing on the interval
(
2
3
, 1
)
. Hence, the only two possibilities
for optimal p are p∗ = 0 and p∗ given by the first order conditions. This is true
for all learning rules considered in this paper, since the argument does not use any
properties of q(p) apart from differentiability. In the following proposition we look at
a condition, which is satisfied whenever the optimal p is positive (this will be called
interior solution henceforth).
Proposition 2A With the average payoff learning rule, the necessary condition for
interior solution is
−1/p∗ + (2− 3p∗) s + 2
1− 3p∗2 + 1
γ
(1− 3p∗ + 3p∗2) > µ
Notice that p∗ in the proposition is by itself depending on the paprameters on the
model. Since we know, however, that it is limited by the interval
(
1√
3
, 2
3
)
in the case
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of interior solution, we can still infer from this proposition the direction of parameter
changes that would bring about interior solution.
Namely, for high values of c and low values of γ, s, t,H (and hence high rhs and
low lhs) ”no auditing - all cheating” equilibrium is chosen. Notice that at p = 1√
3
this condition translates into γ(1 + s) > µ; for p = 2
3
into 4.5 γ
1−γ > µ. From both
inequalities it can be seen that the interior solution does not arise, if γ is small relative
to µ. This is easy to interpret: with small share of high income people (γ) and low
benefit from auditing (stH) it is better not to audit anybody, given that it is costly
(c).
The comparative statics for the interior solution5 gives the following relations
(they hold for other learning rules considered as well):
dp∗
ds
=
q + p∗q¯′
q¯′′ − (1 + s− µ) (2q¯′ + p∗q¯′′) ; (6)
dp∗
dµ
= −
q¯ + p∗q¯′ + 1
γ
− 1
q¯′′ − (1 + s− µ) (2q¯′ + p∗q¯′′) ; (7)
dp∗
dγ
=
µ/γ2
q¯′′ − (1 + s− µ) (2q¯′ + p∗q¯′′) . (8)
where the notation is q¯ = q¯ (p∗) , q¯′ = q¯′ (p∗) , q¯′′ = q¯′′ (p∗). We keep this notation
henceforth.
The sign of any of these derivatives is ambiguous, and first we derive the condi-
tions for these derivatives to have expected signs. By ’expected’ we mean that the
parameter changes act in the same direction for the cases of continuous adjustment in
the interior and discontinuous jump on the border. For example, since increase in γ
brings about, ceteris paribus, the interior solution to be more likely, we expect it also
to increase auditing probability in this solution, that is, we expect dp
∗
dγ
> 0. Similarly,
we expect dp
∗
ds
> 0 and dp
∗
dµ
< 0.
Then, for the auditing probability to increase in the proportion of high income
people we need q¯′′ − (1 + s − µ)(2q¯′ + p∗q¯′′) > 0; for it to increase in the surcharge
rate we need in addition q¯ + p∗q¯′ > 0; to decrease in cost - tax collection ratio µ the
two conditions above suffice. So, jointly for the expected signs we need
5Note that these conditions do not hold on the border, e.g. for p = 2
3
.
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−2(1 + s− µ)q¯′ > q¯′′ ((1 + s− µ) p∗ − 1); (9)
q¯ > −p∗q¯′. (10)
To elaborate more on these relations, we have to use the knowledge of the partic-
ular function q¯(p), which is specific to each learning principle.
Proposition 3A For the average payoff principle, the share of cheaters q¯ in the
interior steady state is a decreasing and strictly convex function of p, e.g. q¯′(p) <
0, q¯′′(p) > 0.
Using this proposition, from 9 we can immediately say that under the best average
principle dp
∗
dγ
> 0 for our baseline parameter values (the generalization of this result
is presented in the appendix), s = 0.8, t = 0.3, c
H−L = 0.06 (µ = 0.2), γ = 0.5.
The fine is usually up to the amount of tax evaded, and I take 20% less than the
whole. The income tax rate ranges from 0.1 to 0.5 across developed countries; the
measures for both c
H−L and γ are bound to be arbitrary, since in reality the auditing
function depends on many more variables than just income, and there is a continuum
of income levels rather than two. A convenient way to think of the first measure is as
of what share of audited income has to be foregone for the auditing itself. Andreoni
et al. (1998, p. 834) take 0.05 as an example, I think of 0.01 to 0.1 as a possible
range. Finally, γ to certain extent reflects the income distribution, and 0.5 gives an
extreme case where there is equal number of rich and poor.
The resulting p∗ = 0.62 brings about dp
∗
dγ
= 0.02 > 0. This states that with
increase of the share of high income taxpayers (the only ones who can cheat!) the
auditing probability in steady state rises, since marginal revenue from auditing goes
up, whereas marginal costs stay the same. For baseline parameter values auditing
is also increasing in the cost - tax bill ratio µ (dp
∗
dµ
= 0.15 > 0) and decreasing in
the amount of fine (dp
∗
ds
= −0.18 < 0), which is contrary to what was expected.
Algebraically, this happens because q¯ < −p∗q¯′ is always satisfied (the proof is in the
appendix).
Intuitively, faced with higher fine or lower auditing costs, the taxpayers will cheat
less in steady state, hence there is no need for the tax authority to commit to a higher
auditing probability. In fact, this stems from the strong asymmetry in the behavior of
tax authority and individuals: the authority is very "smart" in the sense that it can
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predict the level to which the cheating converges for given auditing probability; the
individuals are, to the opposite, very naive, since they just imitate a strategy with
higher payoff.
To get a quantitative feeling about the influence of parameters, I plot the auditing
probability as a function s for the baseline parameter values t = 0.3, c/H = 0.06,
γ = 0.5.
Figure 1. Optimal auditing probability depending on s, baseline parameter values (µ = 0.2).
Comparison with classical game theory The solution obtained can be com-
pared with the Stackelberg-like equilibrium of the classical evasion game, when the
tax authority moves first (much weaker asymmetry). Recall, that in this setup q = 1
if p < 1
1+s
, q = 0 if p > 1
1+s
, and undetermined for the equality. Since auditing is
costly, the authority will choose either p = 0, q = 1, or p = 1
1+s
, q = 0. The latter is
preferred whenever the auditing is not too costly, namely c < γ
1−γ (1+ s)t(H −L), or,
in other terms, µ < γ
1−γ (1 + s) (analogous to the expression in the dynamic version).
Comparative statics is trivial in this setup: zero cheating result is independent of
parameter changes as long as they do not violate rather mild condition of relatively
not too expensive auditing. Auditing probability is decreasing in the surcharge rate,
just as in the previous model. The solution of the static model is discrete, and the
probability of audit jumps to zero for high enough µ or low s.
The prediction of the dynamic model appears to be more plausible, since non-zero
cheating is not observed in reality. As it is known from the literature, the result
of zero cheating in commitment case generalizes for more complicated models with
continuum of taxpayers and presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers. Moreover, the
commitment models are usually criticized on the basis of this unrealistic prediction.
12
The model presented eliminates this fault, and allows us to reconsider the view of
commitment as something implausible. Then it just boils down to the classical case
of dynamic inconsistency, and the willingness to commit is equivalent to the planning
horizon of the authorities.
The comparison of the payoffs of tax authority in evolutionary and classical set-
tings is ambiguous (R(q, p) is the tax revenue):
R(0,
1
1 + s
) = γtH + (1− γ)tL− 1− γ
1 + s
R(q¯(p), p) = γ
3p2 − 1
1− 3p+ 3p2 tH + p(
2− 3p
1− 3p+ 3p2γ(tH + st(H − L))+
+ (1− γ)tL)− cp( 1− 3p
2
1− 3p+ 3p2γ + 1) + (1− p)(
1− 3p2
1− 3p+ 3p2γ + 1)tL
For the parameter values chosen (γ = 0.5, µ = 1
3
), it is better-off with imitating
taxpayers for the magnitude of fine smaller than 0.5 and worse off for the magnitude
larger than 0.5. This is quite intuitive, since low (high) values of s result in large
(small) auditing probability of static no cheating equilibrium; auditing, in turn, is
costly to implement. In dynamic setting the auditing probability for given parameter
values hits the upper bound of 2
3
, and hence is independent of the surcharge rate,
except for the values of s close to 1. Consequently, "static" revenue is increasing with
the fine, whereas the "dynamic" is staying constant.
For the high values of γ the picture remains the same, except that now for very
large values of fine the "dynamic" revenue rises so much that it exceeds the "static"
one. Finally, with decrease in µ the solution with p strictly less than 2
3
is obtained
for larger and larger set of s values, approaching s ∈ (1
2
, 1]. Correspondingly, the
superiority of "static" revenue is preserved only at s = 1
2
in the limit (µ close to 0).
An average taxpayer with high income in Stackelberg setting can only cheat or
not cheat with probability one; in the dynamic case there is a possibility of a mixed
equilibrium:
I(0,
1
1 + s
) = (1− t)H
I(q¯(p), p) = (1− q¯ (p)) (1− t)H + pq¯ (p) ((1− t)H − st(H − L)) + (1− p)q¯ (p) (H − tL)
This brings about higher "dynamic" payoff for the individual, if p < 1
1+s
, and
lower payoff otherwise6. This simple result is straightforward: in the classical setup
6Evaluating I(q¯(p), p)− I(0, 1
1+s
), we get expression the sign of which depends only on the sign
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the equilibrium payoff of taxpayers does not depend on the auditing probability or
the magnitude of fine. Hence, the expected payoff in the dynamic model is greater,
if the audit probability is lower than in the static model, and visa versa. Note that
this does not depend on the learning rule.
Convergence We talk here about dynamic model without explicitly considering
the dynamics itself. It is important that even in steady state the picture is very
different from Nash (Stackelberg) equilibrium. The question of how long it takes to
converge to a steady state escaped our attention so far. As could be expected, the
speed of convergence depends on the particularity of the imitation rule. In the present
case, the learning procedure is in a sense favorable to the cheaters: it takes a long
time to approach no cheating equilibrium, and relatively short time - all cheating one.
Starting from the middle (q = 1
2
), getting as close as 0.001 to the steady state takes
597 periods for honesty case and only 14 periods for cheating case.
This result was obtained analytically by iterating the function qτ+1(qτ , p) respec-
tive number of times. For the honesty case then p = 2
3
, q597 = 0.001; for the case of
cheating p = 1√
3
, q14 = 0.999, whereas q1 = 0.5 in both cases.
3.1.2 No commitment
The authority decides on the optimal auditing rule in every period, assuming that the
distribution of the taxpayers has not changed from the last period qτ+1 = qτ (myopic
best response). Then the payoff of the authority is
γ(1− q)tH + p(qγ(tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ)tL)
−c(p(qγ + 1− γ)) + (1− p)(qγ + 1− γ)tL (11)
Further I consider a linear cost function for the sake of tractability, so that c(p(qγ +
1− γ)) = cp(qγ + 1− γ).
Then the best response strategy is
BR (qτ) =
{
0, if c > c¯ := qτγt(1+s)(H−L)
1−γ+γqτ
1, if c < c¯
As the tax authority is very unlikely to jump from not auditing anybody to auditing
everybody and back, we explicitly augment the choice of tax agency with inertia
of 1− p− ps.
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variable:
pτ+1 = αBR(qτ) + (1− α)pτ (12)
where α determines speed of adjustment; BR is the best response function, which
is defined above as revenue maximizing p given the belief about the distribution of
taxpayers. With α→ 1, we are back to the case of jumping from 0 to 1 probability;
with α → 0, the probability of audit stays very close to an initial level forever. The
dynamics is best seen on the picture.
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
p
q
Figure 2. Phase diagram
Figure 3. Discrete time dynamics, µ1= 0.125
Let µ1 be the level of cheating that induces switch of best response from zero to
one or back:
µ1 :=
1− γ
γ
c
t(1 + s)(H − L)− c
It is interesting whether the dynamics we are considering brings about convergence
of the system to a steady state with
qss = µ1
pss =
µ1 − 1 +
√
−1
3
(µ21 − 2µ1 − 3)
2µ1
or the cycling around this point is possible. Simulation results show that in dis-
crete time setup the cycles are observed, whereas in the continuous time the system
converges. The latter fact is also shown analytically in the appendix.
Comparative static result for the steady state is possible to obtain because all the
parameters are indexed to single µ1, which is bounded by unit interval.
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dpss
dµ1
=
1
2µ21
(
1−
(
1
µ21
+
2
3µ1
− 1
3
)−1
2
(
1
µ1
+
1
3
))
,
which is always negative. Hence, probability of audit in steady state is decreasing
in costs of auditing and increasing in the share of high income taxpayers, the tax rate,
the magnitude of fine, and the income differential. Compared to the Nash equilibrium,
where probability to audit only depends on the surcharge rate, our result looks more
plausible.
Still, for all parameters but s and γ the effects are the opposite of those in the
commitment model. Whereas it is an open question what horizon a particular tax
authority has, we can compare predictions of the two models by their conformability
with stylized facts. First, it is almost uniformly accepted that evasion is increasing in
the tax rate (See, for example, Clotfelter (1983), Poterba (1987), Giles and Caragata
(1999)), so here the commitment model seems to make a better job. Second, there
is also a weak evidence that evasion is rising with the income (Witte and Woodbury
1985), and in this sense the long horizon authority is also superior. There is no
convincing evidence on the influence of auditing costs on the auditing probability,
and it is really difficult to say which model is closer to reality on this point.
Comparison with Nash
In the rest point of the evolutionary game q is the same as in the Nash equilibrium
of one shot game, since it is derived from the same maximizing revenue decision of
tax authority. Auditing probability p can be greater or smaller depending on the
parameter values, because it is determined by the behavior of the individuals, which
is modelled differently. The variation in steady state p is very small: from 1√
3
to 2
3
,
compared to (1
2
, 1) in static case for s < 1. Hence, the difference in p for these two
models is primarily dependent on s: for large values of fine Nash equilibrium gives
less intensive auditing, and for small fines our model results in lower auditing.
As for the payoffs, since q is set so that the tax authority is indifferent between
auditing and not auditing, its revenue is exactly the same in static and dynamic
setups. With fixed q the payoff of the average high income taxpayer is unambiguously
decreasing with p, so that for high penalties the average income is larger in static
model.
Note on the dynamics feature
It is worth noting that the south-west and north-west parts of the picture is
consistent with stylized facts presented in the introduction: both audit probabil-
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ity and the proportion of honest taxpayers decrease (second part of XXth century),
and then eventually audit probability starts increasing, while non-compliance is still
increasing (recent years). According to this explanation, the observed behavior is
out-of-equilibrium adjustment, and sooner or later the tax evasion will have to go
down.
The south-west of generated dynamics also produces values of non-compliance
significantly lower than the Nash equilibrium. This can be taken as an alternative
explanation to the puzzle of too high compliance, usually resolved by introduction of
intrinsically honest taxpayers (Andreoni et al. 1998, Slemrod 2002).
To see whether this kind of dynamics is not idiosyncratic for the learning rule
under consideration, let us proceed to the other specifications of interactions between
the taxpayers.
3.2 Meeting two others: Effective punishment principle
An agent meets two others, and the following (more favorable to the flourishing
of honesty) procedure, in which we go even further away from the expected utility
maximizing agents, takes place. If 3 honest people meet, they will all stay honest for
the next round. If 2 honest and 1 caught cheater (or 1 honest and 2 caught cheaters)
meet, they will all play honest next time. If 2 honest and 1 not caught cheater (or
1 honest and 2 not caught cheaters) meet, they are all cheating next time. If 3 not
caught people meet, they play cheat next time. If 2 caught cheaters and 1 not caught
cheater (or 2 not caught cheaters and 1 caught cheater), they all play honest in the
next round. If all three types meet (or 3 caught people), they play honest next round.
The first four rules are standard; the last two result from the assumption that to
observe punished people (or to be punished) is enough to deter one from cheating for
the next year, and that the cheaters are aware of the option to be honest.
Between rounds q (1− p) (2 (1− q)+q(1−p)) of honest taxpayers switch to cheat-
ing, (1− q + (1− p) q)2 of not caught taxpayers continue cheating, caught taxpayers
do not cheat in the next round. The derivation of the respective probabilities is left
to the appendix. As a result, the law of motion for q is given by
qτ+1 = qτ (1− pτ)
(
3 (1− qτ )2 + 3 (1− qτ) (1− pτ) qτ + (1− pτ)2 q2τ
)
(13)
This is aggregate population dynamics, notice that it does not differ qualitatively
from the previous learning rule. We show this in the following proposition, first
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defining a threshold share of cheating as
q¯ :=
3(1− p2)−
√
1 + 12p− 18p2 + 8p3 − 3p4
2(1− p3)
Proposition 1E Consider the law of motion of q for the effective punishment prin-
ciple given by (13). If p ∈ [0, 2
3
) in this period, then the share of cheating
taxpayers increases in the next period for q < q¯ and decreases for q > q¯. If
p ≥ 2
3
, cheating in the next period decreases.
Further we do not make special subsections for the cases of commitment and
absence of it, as well as for comparison with Nash equilibrium. The logic of the
exposition is the same as for the average payoff learning principle, and the results are
similar.
We start with the commitment case: the dynamic converges to p∗ ∈ [0, 2
3
]
compared with the same as before Stackelberg outcome. The comparative statics is
very much the same (recall that the results (6)-(8) hold for all the rules considered)
as for the previous learning rule, since the relation between p and q is still negative.
The effective punishment rule is contributing more to the honest reporting, and it
is of no surprise that the optimal probability of auditing is lower here for the same
parameter values:
Figure 4. Optimal auditing probability depending on s, baseline parameter values.
However, the following proposition establishes an important result of similarity of
the two learning rules. Namely, the steady state values of the variables are affected
in the same manner by small parameter changes.
Proposition 2E Effective punishment principle results in the same comparative sta-
tics as the average payoff principle, i.e.
dp∗
dγ
> 0,
dp∗
dµ
> 0,
dp∗
ds
< 0.
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From this we can conclude that the one-dimentional dynamics generated by two
rules do not qualitatively differ. Comparison with the static equilibrium is exactly
the same as before. The payoffs of the tax authority for the effective punishment
are increasing in the magnitude of fine slower than for the best average. As a result,
the interval of s for which the tax revenue of static game exceeds that of dynamic
is larger for the effective punishment rule, holding all the parameters constant. The
result for the payoffs of individuals does not change, as it does not depend on the
learning principle.
Convergence features are not altered either: to reach no cheating state from the
middle takes 594 periods now (compared with 597 before); to get to all cheating takes
3 periods (14 before). The latter, however, can not be compared directly, as for the
best average all cheating was attainable at p ∈
[
0, 1√
3
]
and computed for p = 1√
3
; for
the present rule it can only happen for p = 0.
In the no commitment case the system converges (in continuous time) to the
steady state with lower probability of auditing than with the previous rule. The
discrete time cycling has very small amplitude, so that steady state is actually a very
good approximation in this case. The steady state value for q certainly remains the
same, as it does not depend on the learning principle and actually coincide with the
Nash equilibrium value. The steady state value of p comes from (13) as a solution of
the third-order polynomial −µ21p3 + 3µ1p2 − 3p + µ21 − 3µ1 + 2 = 0. From the phase
portrait it is clear that this value is lower than for the best average principle.
 
1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 
1 
0.75 
0.5 
0.25 
0 
 
Figure 5. Phase diagram Figure 6. Discrete time dynamics
For the baseline parameter values (µ1 = 0.07) the steady state value of p is equal
to 0.625 (compared with 0.659 for the previous rule). The values of dq
dx
, where x is
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any parameter of the model (s, γ, t,H, L) are completely unchanged, and the sign of
dpss
dx
= dp
ss
dqss
dqss
dx
is unchanged, since dp
ss
dq
is non-positive for both rules, as we confirm
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3E For the effective punishment principle, the share of cheaters in
interior steady state q¯ is a decreasing function of auditing probability p, e.g.
q¯′ (p) ≤ 0.
As far as the comparison with the Nash equilibrium of the static game is concerned,
everything said for the best average rule remains valid. Among others, the ”dynamic”
auditing probability is normally smaller than the ”static” one ( p ∈ (0, 2
3
)
in dynamic
case and p ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
in the static case). Finally, the dynamic feature of cycling is also
very similar and is consistent with the evidence.
In total, all the main conclusions of best average imitation are preserved under
the effective punishment principle. There is more averse attitude towards the risk of
being punished embodied in this rule. This results in lower cheating in commitment
case, and lower auditing probability for both cases.
3.3 Meeting m others: Popularity principle
Whenm others are observed (and m is substantially larger than 2), we can specify an
imitation rule that requires minimal information about the individual, and namely
only whether he/she was caught cheating. Assume that the availability of this infor-
mation is assured by the tax authority for the purpose of deterring the others. This
seems plausible in the self-employment sector, especially for the professionals like
doctors, auditors, etc. Let k∗ be the maximal number of observed caught individuals
that does not induce switching to honesty. The rule is then the following. For a not
caught taxpayer: if more than k∗ caught individuals are observed, play honest in the
next round, if less or equal - play cheat; for a caught taxpayer: play honest.
The probability to observe less or k∗ caught individuals is defined by
Pr(k ≤ k∗) =
k∗∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(pq)i (1− pq)m−i
Then the cheating is evolving according to
qτ+1 = (1− qτpτ) Pr(k ≤ k∗)
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The problem with this dynamic is that once the systems comes close to extreme
values of q (0 or 1), it is jumping between "almost all cheating" and "almost all
honest" states in every period. This problem obviously states from an ’epidemic’
nature of the specified principle: once there are very many cheaters, almost everybody
meets a caught cheater, and then all those switch to playing honest. But once almost
everybody is playing honest, almost nobody meets a caught cheater, and then almost
everybody is playing cheat.
To make the dynamics more smooth, the usual method is to introduce some kind of
inertia into the system, just like it was already done from the side of the tax authority.
So, let us say that with probability β every unpunished individual changes his/her
strategy according to already specified rule, and, correspondingly, with probability
1− β plays the same strategy as in the previous period. As before, punished people
switch to no cheating with probability 1.
Then in every period (1−β)(1−p)q+βq(1−p)P (k ≤ k∗) cheaters remain cheaters
plus β(1− q)P (k ≤ k∗) honest people switch to cheating. The dynamics is described
by
qτ+1 = qτ(1− pτ)(1− β) + β(1− qτpτ)P (k ≤ k∗) (14)
For small enough values of β it converges to a steady state (cycle in discrete time)
rather than jumps between two extreme values. The weakness of this formulation
is that steady state value of p depends on the inertia parameter, and this gives an
additional ’degree of arbitrariness’ to our model. For baseline parameter values p is
increasing in β, which is understandable: tax authority has to control more, if larger
part of individuals is reconsidering their decision at every period. Formally, in steady
state (p+ β − pβ)q = β(1− qp)P (k ≤ k∗). Then dp
dβ
= P (1−qp)+pq−q
q−qβ−β( ∂P∂p (1−qp)−Pq)
, which has
an arbitrary sign.
It is very hard to analyze the m-dynamic analytically, since for variable k∗ it
involves operating with sums of variable length. That is why I for the moment
restrict my attention to the case where observing one caught individual is enough to
deter from evasion (k∗ = 0), just like it was specified in the effective punishment rule.
The dynamics is then
qτ+1 = qτ(1− pτ)(1− β) + β(1− qτpτ)m+1 (15)
For obvious reasons the closed form solution is impossible to obtain even for this
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simplified problem. So, I simulate steady state for β = 0.1 and m = 19. Obviously,
the other line is still q = µ1. In no commitment case we again observe small cycles
around the steady state with the implications similar to the previous rules.
Figure 7. Steady state line for m-rule, qτ+1= qτ Figure 8. Discrete time dynamics
Compared to the previous imitation rules, the line qτ+1 = qτ is shifted to low
cheating - low auditing corner, meaning that steady state is more likely to have low
probability of auditing. This comes from 2 factors: inertia in decision making β and
number of people to meet m. Notice, however, that even for p → 1 cheating is
not eliminated completely. Indeed, for pτ = 1 qτ+1 = β(1 − qτ)m+1, so that q = 0
only for β = 0, which is impossible. Hence, for large auditing probabilities m-rule
results in larger cheating than 2-rules. This seemingly strange result stems from poor
information set of the individuals: if nobody is cheating, nobody is caught, so in the
next period β of individuals will cheat.
In the commitment case, then, cheating can be decreasing or increasing depend-
ing on whether qτ > qˆ (p
∗) or the opposite. This is true for any value of p chosen by
the tax authority. Comparative statics is again similar to the previous rules, since
the relation between p and q is negative. Since honest reporting is favored even more
by this m-rule, we expect optimal auditing to be lower for the same parameters. The
magnitude of fine is almost irrelevant under the present imitation rule, since there
is no information about payoffs, and people are deterred from evasion by observing
caught cheaters regardless of financial costs of being caught.
This intuition is supported by simulation results: for our parameter values the
change of surcharge rate is not changing optimal p, and the equilibrium auditing
is lower than before: 0.43 compared with 0.65 and 0.64 for the first two rules (the
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difference between rules is increasing with the cost of auditing). Note that this stems
mostly from higher number of people who interact, rather than from the different
information structure of the rule. Indeed, for m = 2 optimal probability is 0.61,
not substantially lower than for the other two rules. The auditing probability is
rising with the proportion of high income taxpayers, just like in two previous cases.
However, it is decreasing in the cost of auditing, and hence in µ.
Figure 9. Optimal probability depending on γ.Figure 10. Optimal probability depending on c.
So, with the minimum information learning rule the difference in comparative
statics between commitment and no commitment cases disappears. Such astounding
difference in comparison with first two learning rules is fully attributed to the form
of steady state relation between q and p. Recall that dp
∗
ds
, dp
∗
dγ
, dp
∗
dµ
vary across the rules
only in qˆ′ = qˆ′ (p) and qˆ′′ = qˆ′′ (p) . Thus, the reversed result for the present rule is
due to
qˆ + pˆq′ > 1− 1
γ
(16)
To further characterize the steady state with popularity principle, we take m = 1
still keeping k∗ = 0 to arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 1M With population dynamics of poor information (popularity) rule
given by (15) and m = 1, the relation between share of cheaters and auditing
probability qˆ (p∗) in steady state is a non-increasing and convex function. At
the same time, qˆ + pqˆ′ ≥ 0 holds.
Taking into account this proposition and (16) we have 1− 1
γ
< 0 ≤ qˆ + p∗qˆ′, and
hence the result of dp
∗
dµ
< 0 holds for any parameter values in our example.
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In total, the poor information rule shows that the unusual results for commitment
case is due to high informativeness of the taxpayers about each others. When there
is no information about payoffs contained in communication, the individuals abstain
from evasion on even more "irrational" grounds than before. Then, for not too high
auditing, more honesty results. Increasing the number of people met in this rule
also brings about less cheating, because seeing more people means higher chance of
observing a caught one.
The main conclusions from previous imitation rule are still valid for m people
meeting. Namely, there is still non-zero cheating with commitment and the dynamics
in the western part which is consistent with observations.
4 Conclusion
The model presented in the paper is designed to capture a number features of reality,
which were largely neglected in the literature on tax evasion, and especially in the
game-theoretic approach to the problem. These features are social interaction, poor
knowledge of auditing probability, asymmetry in the behavior of two parties under
consideration, and intertemporal nature of the tax evasion decision. The interaction
in the model is learning each others’ strategies and payoffs. This allows individuals to
make decisions without acquiring information about auditing probability. Moreover,
with simple imitation rules specified in the game, people also avoid costs of processing
information, as they effectively know what decision to take without solving compli-
cated maximization problems.
The model rationalizes decrease of auditing probability and compliance observed
in the US over past decades as out-of-equilibrium dynamics. The same is true for the
recent continuing increase of evasion along with tightening auditing. The model can
also explain ”too little” cheating by taxpayers: having initially overestimated auditing
probability, they ”undercheat” for a long time due to the inertia and imperfections
of the learning rules. All these results hold with three different specifications of the
learning rule (our rules differ in how much people are afraid of being caught and how
much information they can learn from each other).
When we allow the tax agency to commit to a certain probability of auditing,
positive cheating may arise in equilibrium. This is seems more plausible than the
result obtained in the most of static commitment models. Such models usually have
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zero cheating of audited taxpayers in equilibrium. Moreover, the comparative statics
with respect to tax rate does not contradict empirical evidence (cheating is increasing
with tax), as opposed to the models in the literature. However, the model has its
obvious limitations. For instance, nothing can be said about the extent of inertia in
auditing decision, though this could probably be empirically testable. Without good
feeling about the inertia parameter and the learning rule we can not say much about
the precise form the dynamics takes.
In general, the dynamic approach to tax compliance games reopens a whole bunch
of policy issues. Are the recommendations of equilibrium theory valid, if the systems
never comes to equilibrium? Are some changes in the existing taxation worth un-
dertaking, if we take into consideration not only difference in benefits between initial
and final states, but also the costs of transition? Can the decision rules of the tax au-
thorities and the learning mechanisms governing taxpayers behavior be manipulated
in the way to achieve maximal social welfare?
As a building block for more general models, the evolutionary approach can be
employed in the studies on how the government can ensure higher degree of trust in
society (and less evasion as a result), how it can provide optimal (from the point of
view of social welfare) level of public goods, how it can bring about faster growth of
an economy. For this it would be necessary to consider more complicated government
(and hence tax authorities) strategies, involving more than one period memory, and
possibly heterogenous taxpayers.
Finally, the approach taken by no means limits us to consideration of income tax
evasion. Even more interesting and exciting task would be to look at all other taxes,
especially those levied on enterprises. In this case learning is probably more intensive,
as well as interaction with tax authorities. Moreover, the absolute size of evasion is
very likely to be higher than in case with individuals. The modeling of enterprise
cheating would probably allow us to understand better how the shadow sector in
general is functioning.
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5 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1A Solving 3 for the steady state, we get q = 2−3p
1−3p+3p2 .
Knowing that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, we obtain 1√
3
≤ p ≤ 2
3
for this steady state re-
lation to hold. For p < 1√
3
and p > 2
3
the steady state solutions are corner
ones, with q = 1 and q = 0 respectively. For the interior solution, solving 3 as
inequality gives the statements of proposition.
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Proof of proposition 2A In order to get interior solution, we have to get more tax
revenue at p = p∗ than at p = 0. That is, the following inequality should hold:
γ(1− q)tH + p(qγ(tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ)tL)
−c(p(qγ + 1− γ)) + (1− p)(qγ + 1− γ)tL > tL (17)
γt(H − L)[1− q + pq(1 + s)] > cp(1− γ + qγ) (18)
1− q + pq(1 + s)
p( 1
γ
− 1 + qγ) > µ (19)
−1/p+ (2− 3p)s+ 2
1− 3p2 + 1
γ
(1− 3p+ 3p) > µ, (20)
which is just the statement of the proposition.
Proof of proposition 3A Directly differentiating q(p) gives the expression 3(3p
2−4p+1)
(1−3p+3p2)2with
positive denominator. The nominator is negative for p ∈ (1
3
, 1). Since our p is
defined on
[
1√
3
, 2
3
]
, q′ < 0, q(p) is decreasing.
Differentiating q(p) twice, we get 3
[
3p2−1
1−3p+3p2 +
1−4p+3p2
1−3p+3p2
3−6p
(1−3p+3p2)2
]
. All the de-
nominators are again positive; the first nominator is positive for p > 1√
3
, the second
nominator is negative for p ∈ (1
3
, 1), the third one is negative for p > 1
2
. Hence,
q′′ > 0, q(p) is strictly convex on the interval where it is defined.
Generalization of comparative statics results A sufficient condition for the signs
of this and other derivatives to be the same as at the baseline is
1 + s > µ and p∗ <
1
1 + s− µ
To see that this condition is not very restrictive, notice that first inequality cer-
tainly holds for any values of s and µ we think of as plausible. The second expression
is satisfied for any p∗, if it is for p∗max =
2
3
. In other words, it certainly holds for any
combination of s and µ such that s− µ < 1
2
. Referring back to our plausible ranges,
for any µ this condition holds for s ≤ 1
2
.
Finally, for dp
dµ
> 0 we have to add γ > 1
7
to gueranty that the term 1
γ
− 1 does
not outweigh the negative q + pq′.
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Proof of the statement q¯ < −p∗q¯′ Plugging in expressions for q and q′ into the
inequality claimed, we get
(2− 3p) (1− 3p+ 3p2)
3 (1− 4p+ 3p2) < −p
(2− 3p) (1− 3p + 3p2) < −3p (1− 4p+ 3p2)
3p2 − 6p+ 2 < 0,
which holds for p ∈ (1 − 1√
2
, 1 + 1√
2
), and hence for the relevant for us interval[
1√
3
, 2
3
]
.
Stability of the steady state in continuous time To investigate stability of the
steady state analytically, we have to make two approximations. First, consider
the system in continuous time: this makes sense, if we imagine that both the
tax authority and individuals update their evasion or auditing decisions every
day, rather than fixing it once for a whole year. We can rewrite our system of
equations as
qτ+∆ = qτ +∆f(qτ , pτ),
pτ+∆ = pτ +∆g(qτ , pτ);
and letting ∆ be very small ( 1
365
, if we think of daily updating), in the limit we
obtain
q˙ = f(q, p),
p˙ = g(q, p);
Explicitly,
q˙ = 2q − 3q2 + q3 − 3pq + 6pq2 − 3pq3 − 3p2q2 + 3p2q3,
p˙ = α (BR(q)− p) ;
The stability matrix of this system is
(
∂q˙
∂q
∂q˙
∂p
∂p˙
∂q
∂p˙
∂p
)
=
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, where
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a11x = 2− 6q − 3p+ 12pq + 3q2 − 6p2q − 9pq2 + 9p2q2,
a12 = −3q + 6q2 − 6pq2 − 3q3 + 6pq3,
a21 = αBR
′(q),
a22 = −α.
The problem with this formulation is that the best response function is not con-
tinuous at the point of steady state, so we can not compute BR′(qss). To go around it,
we can make the second approximation: instead of the discontinuous best response
we take a continuous function ABR(q) = Φ
(
c¯(q)−c
σ
)
, which approaches BR(q) ={
0, if c¯ < c
1, if c¯ > c
with σ → 0. Conventionally, Φ is cumulative distribution function of
a standard normal random variable. Then ABR′(q) = φ
(
c¯(q)−c
σ
)
c¯′(q)
σ
. Recalling the
expression for c¯(q) and evaluating at steady state (c¯(qss) = c), we get
ABR′(qss) = φ (0)
(1− γ) c
σq (1− γ + qγ) ⇒ a21 ≈
α (1− γ) c√
2πσ2q (1− γ + qγ) .
Note that we can make a21 (since it is positive) arbitrary large by making σ small
enough and thus getting better approximation of initial best response function.
Now we are ready to adress the question of stability of the steady state. If the
real parts of both eigenvalues of the stability matrix are negative, the steady state is
stable (see, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974). The eigenvalues of our system are
λ1,2 =
1
2
(
a11 + a22 ±
√
(a11 − a22)2 + 4a12a21
)
.
First we show that the real parts of the two eigenvalues are identical. This is
equivalent to showing that the square root is an imaginary number, or that the
expression under the square root is negative. Indeed, since a11 − a22 is bounded and
a21 is arbitrary large, the square root is imaginary, if a12 < 0. Let us plot it as a
function of q, using the fact that in steady state p =
3q−3+
√
9(1−q)2−12q(q−2)
6q
:
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As q is determined on the interval [0, 1] , a12 ≤ 0 (with equality in the corners),
so that the real parts of the both eigenvalues are identical and equal to a11 + a22.
It is left to determine the sign of a11, since a22 = −α. We plot it as a function of
p, using the fact that in steady state q = 2−3p
1−3p+3p2 :
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As p is determined on the interval
[
1√
3
, 2
3
]
, and is zero at the corners, a11 < 0
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for all interior points. Hence, both eigenvalues have negative real parts7 - our steady
state is stable in continuous time.
Probabilities of switching Recall that there are (1− q) honest taxpayers, each of
which meet another honest and not caught cheater with probability 2 (1− q) (1− p) q,
or two not caught cheaters with probability (1− p)2 q2. Summing this gives
probability of switching.
There are also (1− p) q not caught cheaters. (1− q)2 of themmeet 2 honest peo-
ple, 2 (1− q) (1− p) q meet another not caught and an honest, and (1− p)2 q2
meet 2 not caught cheaters. The sum is probability to remain a cheater.
Proof of proposition 1E Solving (13) for the steady state, we get q =
3(1−p2)−
√
1+12p−18p2+8p3−3p4
2(1−p3) .
Knowing that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, we obtain p ≤ 2
3
for this steady state relation to hold.
For p > 2
3
the steady state solution is corner with q = 0. For the interior
solution, solving (13) as inequality gives the statements of proposition.
Proof of proposition 2E We have to get explicit expressions for q′ and q′′, plug
them into the formulas (6)-(8) and evaluate those at the baseline parameter val-
ues (for them p∗ ≈ 2
3
). Thus, q′= p
2
4p6−8p3+4
(
18− 6
√
12p− 18p2+8p3−3p4+1−18p2
)
−
1
2p3−2
(
18p−12p2+6p3−6√
12p−18p2+8p3−3p4+1
− 6p
)
; q′′ = p
4p6−8p3+4
(
36− 12
√
12p− 18p2+8p3−3p4+1− 36p2
)
+
3 p
4
6p3−6p6+2p9−2
(
18p2+6
√
12p− 18p2+8p3−3p4+1− 18
)
+ p
2
4p6−8p3+4
(
6 18p−12p
2+6p3−6√
12p−18p2+8p3−3p4+1
−36p
)
+
p2
4p6−8p3+4
(
−36p− 3 24p2−36p−12p3+12√
12p−18p2+8p3−3p4+1
)
+ 1
2p3−2
(
24p−18p2−18√
12p−18p2+8p3−3p4+1
+ √
12p−18p2+8p3−3p4+1+12p
√
Plugging in parameters, we get dp
ds
= −0.258 26 < 0, dp
dµ
= 0.043 > 0, dp
dγ
= 0.08
6 > 0.
Proof of proposition 3E Taking the derivative of q(p) gives
12(1−p3)
(
−p−(1+12p−18p2+8p3−3p4)
−
1
2 (1−3p+2p2−p3)
)
+p2
(
3(1−p2)−
√
1+12p−18p2+8p3−3p4
)
(2(1−p3))2 .The de-
nominator is always positive; plotting the nominator shows that it is negative
on the interval
[
0, 2
3
]
. This yields the statement of proposition.
Proof of proposition 1M The function determining steady-sate realation between
q and p is implicitly given by
7For the corners ( 1√
3
, 1) and
(
2
3
, 0
)
both eigenvalues are real, λ1 = 0, λ2 = −α, which can be
checked directly by direct substitution of p and q with these particular values. In any case, the
corner solutions are not of interest to us, since they are not observed in reality.
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q = q(1− p)(1− β) + β(1− qp)2 (A1)
From this we can see that on the domain (0, 1) and with the image (0, 1), q(p) is
twice continuously differentiable. By totally differentiating the steady state expression
with respect to q and p, we get dq
dp
= q(2βpq−1−β)
p+β+pβ(1−2pq) . As 1− 2pq > −1 and pβ < p, the
denominator is non-negative. As 2βpq < 2β < 1 + β, the nominator is non-positive.
Hence, q is non-increasing function of p.
Differentiating the slope of q(p) with respect to p, we get a ratio with positive de-
nominator (p + β + pβ(1− 2pq))2 and nominator q′ [4qpβ(p+ β + pβ − qp2β)− (p+ β + pβ + β2 + pβ2
4q2pβ(qpβ − β − 1) + q(2qβ2 + 2β + β2 + 1),
which is claimed to be non-positive. To prove this, I first show that qp ≤ 2
5
.
Solving the equation A1 for qp we get qp = 1
2
(
1
β
+ 1−
√(
1
β
+ 1
)2
− 4 (1− q)
)
.
To establish the inequality, then, we have to show that 1
β
+1−
√(
1
β
+ 1
)2
− 4 (1− q) ≤
4
5
This expression is increasing in q, so we have to find minimal value of q, which by
the first part of the present proposition is achieved at p = 1. Plugging in this value
into A1 we get q = β(1 − q)2 and hence q = 1 + 1
2β
− 1
2
√(
2 + 1
β
)2
− 4. Combining
two expressions, one gets
1
β
+ 1−
√√√√√( 1
β
+ 1
)2
− 4

 1
2β
− 1
2
√(
2 +
1
β
)2
− 4

 ≤ 4
5
(
1
β
+
1
5
)2
≤
(
1
β
+ 1
)2
− 4
 1
2β
− 1
2
√(
2 +
1
β
)2
− 4

2
5β
+
1
25
≤ 4
β
+ 1− 2
√(
2 +
1
β
)2
− 4
18
5β
+
24
25
− 2
√(
2 +
1
β
)2
− 4 ≥ 0(
9
5β
+
12
25
)2
≥
(
2 +
1
β
)2
− 4
56
25β2
− 71
125β
+
144
625
≥ 0
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The last expression is a parabola in 1
β
as an argument; it is always above the x
axis, hence the expression holds even with a strict sign. Thus, we actually showed
that qp < 2
5
.
Now, to establish the sign of the second derivative, it is enough to show that
4qpβ(p+ β + pβ − qp2β)− (p+ β + pβ + β2 + pβ2) ≤ 0 and 4q2pβ(qpβ − β − 1) +
q(2qβ2 + 2β + β2 + 1) ≥ 0.
First, rewrite the first condition as p + β + pβ + β2 + pβ2 + 4q2p3β2 ≥ 4qp2β +
4qpβ2+4qp2β2. Notice that the right hand side is smaller than 8
5
β(p+β+ pβ). Then
it is enough to show that p+ β + 4q2p3β2 ≥ 3
5
β(p+ β + pβ). Even without the term
containing q, the inequality holds. To see that, minimize p+ β − 3
5
β(p+ β + pβ) wrt
p. Since there is a global maximum at p|0 < p < 1, the minimum on this interval
should be on the one of the borders. All we have to do then is to check the inequality
at the borders, namely for p = 0 and p = 1. For the former, β − 3
5
β2 ≥ 0 obviously;
for the latter, 1 + β − 3
5
β(1 + 2β) = 1 + 2
5
β − 6
5
β2. Here, again, the global maximum
is at β = 1
6
, the minimum is reached at β = 1; it is 1
5
> 0. Thus, we have proven that
the first condition is satisfied.
Second, rewrite the second condition as q(2qβ2+2β+β2+1+4q3p2β2) ≥ 4q2pβ(β+
1). This holds straightforwardly. So, q′′ ≥ 0, and hence in steady state the share of
cheating as a function of auditing probability is convex.
To show that q + pq′ ≥ 0 holds we plot this expression: y = q + p q(0.2pq−1.1)
p+0.1+0.1p(1−2pq)
1
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Proportional imitation
To apply proportional imitation rule (PIR), which was proposed and shown to be
optimal by Schlag (1998), we have to modify our setup slightly. The problem with
this rule is the need to know the highest and the lowest payoffs of the agents, which
was assumed away so far. This does not seem to be a very strong assumption to
make: people may know the payoff and still not pursue certain strategy, just because
they do not know how to do it.
According to the rule, each agent meets only one other and imitate its strategy
with probability proportionate to the payoff difference, if this other performed better.
Recall that three payoffs of our game are (1 − t)H − st(H − L) if caught, (1 − t)H
if honest, and H − tL if not caught. The difference between the highest and the
lowest is (1 + s)t(H − L), evaded tax plus a fine. Then not caught cheater never
switches; honest taxpayer meeting not caught one switches with probability 1
1+s
; a
caught cheater meeting an honest agent switches with probability s
1+s
.
Then the law of motion for q is given by
1− q(τ + 1) = (1− q)[1− q(1− p) 1
1+s
+ qp s
1+s
],
where the right hand side is again at time τ .
From this expression, the proportion of cheaters increases, if p < 1
1+s
, and de-
creases otherwise. Thus, we get the circling around p = 1
1+s
and q = q(c) again.
Interestingly, only with proportional imitation rule the interior rest point is precisely
the Nash equilibrium of the static game. It happens because in the present specifica-
tion the agents possess more information (about payoffs) and have rather sophisticated
learning technique.
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